How limiting your language can help expand your freedom of speech

As part of a greater strategy of avoiding my work, I recently found myself reading David Bourland’s defence of E-Prime: a form of English without any form of the verb “to be”. Perhaps to further my procrastination, I hope to convince you why this adaptation may prove useful to all critical thinkers, not just linguists.Continue reading “How limiting your language can help expand your freedom of speech”

Vice, Extremism and Liberation: An Interview with Professor Quassim Cassam

What follows is an interview with Warwick’s own Professor Quassim Cassam. The discussion was inspired by Professor Cassam’s inaugural Christmas Philosophy lecture on extremism (based upon his latest book Extremism: A Philosophical Analysis) and his earlier work on vice epistemology. Here, Professor Cassam explains his account of extremism in terms of an extremist mindset andContinue reading “Vice, Extremism and Liberation: An Interview with Professor Quassim Cassam”

Is it reasonable to regret things one did?

By Ben Long In a majority of cases where regret informs our decision-making processes, it can be said to be reasonable. I contend that the reasonability of regret primarily stems from its role in allowing us to actualise as moral agents, through the functions of moral ownership, communication, and authorship. Views that deem regret unreasonableContinue reading “Is it reasonable to regret things one did?”

Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Arne Næss: A dual biography

Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s writing is somewhat unique in philosophy, with its mixture of poetic imagery, romantic tone and polemic, and his writing, if not necessarily the ideas within, received praise throughout the time since it was first published. There are many philosophers who are more rigorous, more convincing, and generally more accurate, but there aren’t manyContinue reading “Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Arne Næss: A dual biography”

The (il)Legitimacy of Constitutional Monarchy: a philosophical paper on a strange form of governance

Matt Munnelly 1 – Introduction This paper will discuss a form of monarchy that is also, supposedly, a democracy. The problem outlined here is an epistemic one: a constitutional monarchy imposes restrictions on the deliberative process necessary for a legitimate democracy. Following introductions to key terms in Part 1, Part 2 provides a sketch ofContinue reading “The (il)Legitimacy of Constitutional Monarchy: a philosophical paper on a strange form of governance”